Notícias
Intervenção do Brasil (em inglês) sobre Garantias Negativas de Segurança, na I Sessão do Comitê Preparatório da XI Conferência de Exame do TNP (Viena, 31/7 a 12/8)
1st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023
Cluster 1 Specific Issue: Negative Security Assurances
Statement by the Delegation of Brazil
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Negative security assurances, when unconditional, irrevocable, and non-discriminatory are a very useful instrument to balance out the rights and obligations of NWS and NNWS and, also, as a means to provide security to those states pending total and complete disarmament.
Through the establishment up of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, with the Treaty of Tlatelolco even preceding the inception of the NPT, NNWS have taken initiatives to bolster their security. The success of the concept led it to reach other regions with the creation of new zones in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, Mongolia and Central Asia, not to mention the special regimes governing Antarctica, the seabed and outer space.
We share the Secretary-General’s view that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are “landmark instruments” that represent an excellent example of the synergy between regional and global efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons”. Moreover, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones should not be considered ends unto themselves, each of these regional agreements adds significant value to the collective efforts to achieve a more peaceful and stable world”.
The value of such zones could be considerably enhanced should Nuclear Weapon States withdraw their interpretive statements that qualify the negative security assurances they extend to NWFZ’s members. Such statements are akin to reservations, which are not admitted by the Treaties. In our specific case, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the pioneer among NWFZ, the Secretary-General of OPANAL (the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) and the OPANAL Council continue to deploy considerable efforts to persuade some NWS to give up the qualifiers regarding their assurances.
It is not by accident that NNWS in the Middle East hanker for Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone and this question was part of the package of decisions and resolutions that extended indefinitely the Treaty in 1995.
Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, we could not ignore reality, as recent events cast a long shadow of doubt on the validity of the concept of negative security assurances. Now, is the time to react promptly and resolutely and seize the opportunity to revive the full potential of Negative Security Assurances.
Of all possible deliverables of the upcoming review cycle on disarmament, the one that is the least controversial and that would imply fewest changes on nuclear doctrines and that would have considerable impact on the level of security enjoyed by NNWS would be to take action towards legally binding universal, unconditional and multilateral Negative Security Assurances.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.