Notícias
Intervenção do Brasil (em inglês) no debate sob o Pilar II- Não-Proliferação na I Sessão do Comitê Preparatório da XI Conferência de Exame do TNP (Viena, 31/7 a 12/8)
1st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023
Cluster 2: Non-Proliferation
Statement by the Delegation of Brazil
Delivered by Mr. Ricardo Ayrosa, Chargé d´Affaires, a.i.,
Permanent Mission of Brazil to the IAEA and PrepCom-CTBTO
Mr. Chairman,
We frequently hear that the NPT’s so-called three pillars are interrelated and should be implemented in a balanced manner. While undeniably true, this notion is often misconstrued as a false equivalence among the pillars. Firstly, one must bear in mind the yawning gap between pillars 1 and 2 in terms of obligations, commitments and implementation. Secondly, the impact of one pillar on one another’s implementation – or lack thereof – is not the same.
The compliance deficit weakening the whole treaty regime is by far greater with respect to the treaty’s ultimate and most important objective: the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.
Perceptions of insecurity generated by the continued existence of nuclear weapons can be considered as one of the drivers of proliferation. Consequently, unfulfilled obligations and commitments related to nuclear disarmament under Article VI have a potential to negatively affect the objectives of Pillar 2.
Although this correlation was evident from the start, the continuation of this situation is increasingly unsustainable, as the bargains enshrined in the treaty itself and in its indefinite extension almost thirty years ago are systematically and blatantly disregarded.
In addition, there have been sustained attempts to further widen the asymmetry of obligations imposed by the treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, which contributed the least to the problem the treaty seeks to address, are the ones called on to take an ever-greater burden to sustain the NPT regime.
Against this background, it is disconcerting to hear the iteration of calls for the Additional Protocol to be considered the "new verification standard" for the obligations established by Article III of the Treaty. Previous NPT Review Conferences, as well as yearly IAEA General Conference resolutions, have consistently recognized the AP as a voluntary measure, and that its adoption is a sovereign decision of any State.
Such proposals imply a reinterpretation of the letter of Article III of the Treaty, akin to an amendment. This is not only unwarranted, both in legal and political terms, but also would open an avenue for similar reinterpretations of other provisions of the NPT, such as those of Article VI, in the light of other international instruments.
Mr. Chairman,
Brazil and Argentina have celebrated in 2021 the 30th anniversary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a unique and innovative safeguards instrument, through which two States Parties perform bilateral cross-inspections of all of each other’s nuclear facilities and material. These inspections are complemented by those of the IAEA, pursuant to the Quadripartite Agreement, which is the legal framework for the application of comprehensive safeguards in both countries.
The robustness of this verification model has been recognized by the UN General Assembly through its resolution 76/52, adopted by consensus, which describes ABACC as an "innovative and effective bilateral confidence-building mechanism, with positive effects for peace and security at the sub regional and regional levels, and as a reference of best practice in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation verification".
We hope that this experience may be used as a source of inspiration for other regions where tensions or disputes involving nuclear issues could be addressed through innovative bilateral or regional confidence-building measures, coupled with multilateral verification arrangements.
Mr. Chairman,
Last July, Brazil succeeded Argentina in the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Brazil has already chaired the NSG in 2006-2007, and our willingness to do so once again is a reflection of Brazil’s commitment to the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation through effective export controls, without prejudice to legitimate trade and cooperation in this field.
Mr. Chairman,
Brazil remains seriously concerned with the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, and condemns the repeated ballistic missile launches by the DPRK. These actions violate relevant Security Council resolutions, threaten international peace and security, and severely undermine the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Brazil continues to advocate for a diplomatic solution based on dialogue to the situation in the Korean Peninsula. We urge the DPRK to comply fully with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to rejoin the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State, to allow the IAEA to resume its safeguards activities in the country, and to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.
We support the efforts underway between the IAEA and Iran on the issue of implementation of verification activities in the country, since the Joint Statement signed last March. We express our hope that those efforts will lead to the resolution of all outstanding issues. Furthermore, we exhort all participants of the JCPoA to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and resolve to allow for the resumption of the full implementation of the plan.
Mr. Chairman,
The issue of nuclear naval propulsion has drawn considerable international attention.
One thing shall remain clear: nothing in the NPT, nor in safeguards regime, nor in the legal framework of nuclear-weapon-free zones, precludes the use of nuclear energy for naval propulsion, as a non-proscribed, legitimate application of such energy.
Brazil understands naval nuclear propulsion as a peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is explicitly characterized as such by the 1991 agreement between Brazil and Argentina on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (circulated as document INFCIRC/395).
This understanding is based on the fact that the use of nuclear energy for propulsion is not inherently military. The nuclear propulsion reactors inside naval vessels have no offensive or destructive function whatsoever. Like land-based reactors, their function is to generate steam, which is then harnessed by turbines and generators to convert the thermal energy of the reactor into electric energy and to drive the vessel’s propulsion systems.
This is not an understanding that is unique to Brazil or to our bilateral agreement with Argentina. Other international agreements also characterize naval nuclear propulsion as not inherently military, even when used in military vessels. An important example is the 1959 OECD Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy (OECD/LEGAL/0020). Article 17 of that Convention specifically excludes propulsion from its definition of “military purpose” in connection to the use of special fissionable materials.
After a decades-long effort for the indigenous development of its nuclear naval propulsion programme, on December 2021, Brazil informed the IAEA, through ABACC, of its decision to initiate discussions with the Secretariat on an arrangement for special procedures for the verification of nuclear material in nuclear propulsion for submarines and their prototypes, in accordance with Article 13 of the Quadripartite Agreement.
The aim of these special procedures is to ensure the Agency´s ability to continue to fulfil its non-proliferation mandate both under the Statute and under the NPT, while protecting sensitive operational and technological information related to Brazil’s naval nuclear propulsion programme.
Since then, a series of productive meetings have been held with the Secretariat of both the IAEA and ABACC, and preliminary design information was provided by Brazil. This process was described by the IAEA Director General in his report to the Board of Governors last May (GOV/INF/2023/11). On that occasion, the DG confirmed his willingness to keep Member States informed on the progress of the discussions.
Brazil is also committed to transparency in relation to the issue, as demonstrated by our stance both within the IAEA and NPT contexts. The working paper circulated during the NPT Review Conference last year (NPT/CONF.2020/WP.71) provides clarifications on the background and rationale of Brazil’s NNP programme, as well as on the nature, legal framework and purposes of the future verification arrangement under discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.