

# Measures to create Confidence in Nuclear Technology (Electricity Production)




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**1<sup>st</sup> Seminar on Exchange with the  
Nuclear Energy Agency**

**Rio de Janeiro – Brazil / 20 March, 2018**

## Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents: Some Classic (Obvious) Examples



### Three Mile Island 2

- New Safety Requirements much more severe.
- Delays in the Construction of NPPs.
- Strong increase in Construction Cost.
- “Almost” a US Moratorium for Construction of New NPPs.



### Chernobyl 4

- An Italian Public Referendum canceled the Construction of NPP Montalto de Castro (1988) and Decommissioning NPPs Enrico Fermi and Caorso (1990).
- There were consequences in Brazil, contributing to slow down the Construction of Angra 2.



### Fukushima Daiichi


- Japan: 42 “Operable” Reactors / Only 5 plants in Operation.
- Germany: Government decided to phase out all NPPs.
- Italy: The society confirmed the referendum to ban nuclear energy.

## Factors that also decrease Confidence in Nuclear Energy

### Examples Non-exclusives

- **Long Periods of interruption in Power Supply (Forced Outages) due to Technical Defects or System Deficiencies.**
- **Frequent interruptions in Power Supply, even for Short Periods.**
- **Bad Financial Situation of the Power Company (Operator / Owner).**
- **Delays and Cost Overruns during Construction of New Plants.**
- **Reports / Findings of Corruption.**

## Examples of the Paradoxical Benefits for the Nuclear Industry on the Long-term Horizon: "Lessons Learned"



### Three Mile Island 2

- Creation of **Technical Support Centers** within the plants as part of the **basic design**.
- Creation of the **Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)**.



### Chernobyl 4

- Creation of the **International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG)** by the IAEA and the **World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)**.
- The concept of **"Safety Culture"** emerged for the first time.



### Fukushima Daiichi

- All countries operating **NPP** performed **"Stress Tests"** for their plants, developing more judicious **Safety Reassessments**, in order to ensure the **functioning of Safety Systems** in the face of extreme natural phenomena beyond the design bases.
- **IAEA and WANO** increase mutual cooperation to maximize efforts for nuclear safety worldwide and reduced the intervals of their safety missions.

## To whom the Nuclear Industry must convey Confidence

- **Nuclear Regulation Authority** (in Brazil CNEN)
- **Workers of Nuclear Installations**
- **Suppliers of Goods and Services**
- **Customers of Energy Production Services**
  - **Power Transmission Companies**
  - **Power Distribution Companies**
- **Society** (Public Acceptance)



## Confidence is basically conveyed through:

- **Reliable Operation: Maximization of Energy Production**
  - **High Availability and Capacity Factors (indicators).**
  - **Increase in Monetary Gains arising from the Commercialization of Energy.**
  
- **Safe Operation of NPPs: Safe Production of Energy**
  - **High Availability Factors of the Safety Systems (indicators).**
  - **Strict Compliance with National and International Safety Standards.**
  - **Low Risk Level throughout the Operational Cycle.**
  - **Extensive use of International Operational Experience.**

## Obtaining Continuous Improvement of the Operational Performance:



### ➤ Comparisons with International References

- **Adoption of best Operational Practices.**
- **Participation in WANO Peer Review Missions.**
- **Participation in IAEA OSART Missions.**
- **Implementation of Programs to improve the Human Performance.**
- **Implementation of Programs to improve the Safety Culture.**
- **Transparency and good relationship with the population neighboring NPPs Angra 1 and Angra 2.**

**More than 20,000 people (per year) visit the NPP Information Center, including Universities from all over the Country and Special Programs for Schools in the region surrounding the NPPs.**

## IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety

### IAEA INSAG 4




## Committees to improve the Adherence to the Integrated Safety Management Policy


1. **CROU: Plant Operation Review Committee**
2. **CAON: Nuclear Operation Analysis Committee**
3. **COSIS: Independent Safety Oversight Committee**



## Operational Depth Defenses






## Corporate Depth Defenses



## Safety Culture Program: Based on the 7 Principles recommended by the IAEA and, additionally, considering the concepts defined by WANO and INPO.



- **Priority:** Nuclear safety is a priority and more important than productivity and economy and is not to be compromised for any reason.
- **Presence in the Field:** The Leadership Presence is required in the Activities of the Operational Processes.
- **Responsibility:** Safety Responsibilities must be clearly defined and various legal requirements must be met.
- **Training:** All of the employees and service providers must be qualified and aware of various aspects of Integrated Safety.
- **Prevention:** Risks to Health, Safety and the Environment must be always avoided.
- **Communication:** Communication Processes should be Transparent and Efficient, especially under Unsafe Conditions.
- **Continuous Improvement:** We seek the Continuous Improvement of our Practices related to Integrated Safety Management.



## Indicators Panel: INTRANET



### PAINEL DE INDICADORES

Painel de Indicadores Operacionais  
Comparação Internacional (EUGC)

Meus Indicadores

(Melhor visualizado pelo Internet Explorer)

[Ver Lista de Responsáveis pela atualização dos Indicadores](#)

Indicadores de Custo (Exigências de Receita)
Custo Operacional (O&M + A&G)
Custo de Combustível Queimado
Custo Total Operacional (O&M + A&G + Comb. Queim.)
Custo de Capital
Outros Custos
Impostos, Taxas e Contribuições
Aquisição de Combustível
Receitas de Vendas de Energia e Serviços
Despesas Financeiras Líquidas
Exigências Mínimas de Receita
Receitas - Exigências Mínimas

Indicadores de Lucratividade
Giro de Capital
Índice de Pagamentos de Dividendos
Índice de Participação de Terceiros
Índice do Exigível - Patrimônio Líquido
Lucro Líquido
EBITDA
Lucro por Ação Ordinária
Taxa de Crescimento do Lucro
Taxa Operacional - ETN
Margem de Lucro
Rentabilidade do Capital Próprio
Retorno sobre o Investimento

Indicadores de Segurança
Exposição Coletiva à Radiação
Total de Acidentes Industriais
Desempenho dos Sistemas da Usina
Desarmes Totais não Planejados do Reator
Índice de Confiabilidade do Combustível
Indicador Químico

Indicadores de Capitalização
Investimento Total Anual
Participação de Terceiros
Índice do Exigível - Patrimônio Líquido
Nível de Inventário
Turn Rate do Inventário
Valor Patrimonial Líquido

Condições de Mercado e Orientação
Preço Médio Ponderado da Energia Elétrica Vendida
Oferta (Capacidade / Disponibilidade)
Crescimento da Demanda (Crescimento da Carga)
Crescimento da Capacidade Instalada - Brasil
Taxa de Inflação
Preço da Energia Elétrica
Demanda (Carga)

Indicadores de Operação por MWh
Custo de Barramento
Going Forward Cost
Custo de Combustível Queimado /MWh
Custo de Produção /MWh
Custo Operacional /MWh

Indicadores de Produtividade
Energia Bruta e Líquida Gerada
Fator de Disponibilidade de Energia
Fator de Capacidade
Fator de Perda de Disponibilidade Planejada
Taxa de Perda Forçada
Fator de Perda de Disponibilidade Não Planejada
Taxa de Crescimento da Receita
Duração de Paradas
Receita Bruta
Backlog de Manutenção Corretiva
Geração Líquida Por Empregado
Desempenho Térmico
Número de Empregados por MW Instalado
Percentual de Homem Hora Treinado na DO
Intensidade Energética (ROL)


CMDE 2018-2022
EBITDA Gerencial / ROL Ajustada
Dívida Líquida / EBITDA Gerencial
Lucro Líquido / Patrimônio Líquido
Investimento Realizado / Investimento Aprovado
PMSO Clássico / ROL Ajustada
PMSO Clássico / PMSO Regulatório
Índice de Disponibilidade de Geração Relativa (DISPGR)
Índice de Desempenho do PROERP
Remediação das Deficiências Significativas
Controle de Remediação das Deficiências
Satisfação dos colaboradores
Taxa de Frequência de Acidentes de Trabalho
Redução do Consumo Próprio de Energia Elétrica
Redução do Consumo de Combustíveis Fósseis
Redução do Consumo Administrativo de Água
Emissões Totais de GEE / ROL

Indicadores de Valuation
Valor Presente Líquido - VPL
Taxa Interna de Retorno - TIR

Indicadores da Qualidade
Editais e Propostas
Requisição de Compra
Solicitação de Ação Corretiva


## Indicators Panel: Example

## Availability Factor: Angra 1 + Angra 2







## Indicators Panel: Example **Safety Systems Performance: Angra 2**



## Indicators Panel: Example Collective Exposure to Radiation: Angra 1 + Angra 2



## Impact of Suspension of Operation of Angra 1 and Angra 2 NPPs ~~in 2019~~ Report ONS 0105-2017 / Letter 1516/100/2017 from ONS to MME



- If the NPPs Angra 1 and Angra 2 are not available for the operation ~~in 2019~~, the expected value of the total operating cost in the period 2017/2021 will be increased by 5.1%.
- The operation of these 2 plants for 1 month corresponds to 0.9% of the maximum storable energy (water in the hydroelectric reservoirs plants) of the Southeast / Center-West subsystem.
- NPPs Angra 1 and Angra 2 play a fundamental role in the electric and energetic service to the Southeast/Center-West subsystem and to the SIN (National Energy Transmission System) ~~in the year 2019~~.

**MME: Ministry of Mines and Energy**

**ONS: National Operator of System**  
Responsible for the dispatch of all Brazilian plants, whatever the fuel.

**SIN: National Integrated System**  
(Energy Transmission System)



# Thanks

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